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THE EROSION OF REFUGEE RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA:
TWO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE MIGRATION ACT
ANDREW N. LANGHAM
Abstract: The Australian government has proposed two amendments to the
Migration Act. The first excludes judicial review of administrative determinations in the
immigration context. The second severely limits how and when detained refugees can
access information regarding their rights as asylum seekers. Refugees arrive in Australia
vulnerable and wholly ignorant of the legal system, and must make their claims for
asylum in a politically hostile atmosphere. Current immigration laws protect the integrity
of the system by making judicial review of immigration determinations possible in some
cases and by giving refugees access to information on the refugee determination process.
The proposed amendments will undermine the accuracy and effectiveness of Australia's
system for determining refugee status, which will inevitably lead to mistakes. Such
mistakes will result in a violation of the refoulement principle, under which no refugee
may be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution or torture.
The proposed amendments will weaken Australia's refugee determination system and
should be rejected.
I. INTRODUCTION
The claim to refugee status is a transnational invocation of the ideals
of freedom and self-determination.' These ideals define the modem liberal
democracy. In searching for the protection that freedom provides, the
refugee tests the boundaries of a state's commitment to these ideals. The
ideological commitment of many states to the protection of refugees is
continually challenged by political opposition to rising immigration levels.
Australia is no exception.
The term refugee was initially defined in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which
was amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee
Protocol]. This definition is the criterion used under Australian immigration law to determine whether a
non-citizen qualifies for a "protection visa." If a non-citizen is a refugee as defined under these
conventions, then Section 36 of Australia's Migration Act of 1958 allows the refugee to obtain a protection
visa. Migration Act, 1958, § 36 (Austl.). Although under Australian immigration law, those qualifying as
refugees are granted a "protection visa," in other countries, including the United States, refugees are
granted "asylum." These are simply different legal terms used to describe the same status. See
Immigration and Nationality Act, 1958, §§ 101(a)(42), 208 (Austl.). Since the term "asylum" is the legal
term used in the municipal law of most countries, this Comment will generally use that term.
2 Howard Adelman, Justice, Immigration and Refugees, in IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY:
AUSTRALIA AND CANADA COMPARED 63, 79 (Howard Adelman et al. eds., 1994).
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During the 1999 session of the Australian Parliament, two recently
introduced immigration amendments will be considered: the Migration
Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Bill ("Judicial Review
Amendment") 3 and the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2)
("Amendment No. 2").4 Substantially similar versions of both amendments
have been presented to Parliament in the past but have failed to gain
sufficient support.5 If enacted, these amendments will significantly alter
Australian refugee law by further narrowing the opportunity for a refugee to
present a credible asylum claim.6 The Judicial Review Amendment will
make decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal final by eliminating the
opportunity for judicial review of these decisions. Amendment No. 2 places
the onus for requesting information about refugee status on a detained
refugee and restricts when and under what conditions information can be
provided to a detained refugee.
This Comment argues that the proposed amendments undermine the
accuracy and effectiveness of Australia's refugee determination process and
should be rejected. Part II examines the concept of refugee protection and
the development of Australian refugee law. Part III describes the current
system for processing refugee claims. This Part examines the procedure for
claiming asylum and the opportunity for judicial review of administrative
determinations on refugee status. Part IV examines the effects and
implications of the proposed amendments and argues that the amendments
should be rejected because they will undermine the fairness of the refugee
determination process. Part V considers the amendments in relation to
Australia's international obligations and questions whether Australia will
remain in compliance with international law if the amendments are passed.
3 Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Bill 1998, available in The Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia Homepage (visited Feb. 4, 1999) <http://www.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/billsnet>
[hereinafter Judicial Review Amendment].
4 Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1998, available in The Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia Homepage (visited Feb. 4, 1999) <http://www.aph.gov.au/parlinfolbillsnet>
[hereinafter Amendment No. 2].
5 The predecessor to the Judicial Review Amendment was the Migration Legislation Amendment
Bill No. 5, which failed in 1997. MARY CROCK, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 265
(1998) (citing Migration Legislation Amendment Bill No. 5, 1997). The predecessor to Amendment No. 2
was called the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill No. 2, which failed in 1996. Id. at 213 (citing
Migration Legislation Amendment Bill No. 2, 1996).
6 Similar limitations on judicial review of refugee determinations are also in effect in the United
States and in Western Europe. See generally Erwin Cherminsky, A Framework for Analyzing the
Constitutionality ofRestrictions on Federal Court Jurisdiction in Immigration Cases, 29 U. MEM. L. REV.
295 (1999); Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of
Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Refugee Protection in International Law
In the aftermath of World War II, a genuine resolve emerged among
the international community to provide legal mechanisms to help refugees.7
The 1951 United Nations ("U.N.") Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("Refugee Convention") and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees ("Refugee Protocol") were the first major agreements to
offer refugees legal protection.8  Although both agreements impose weak
requirements on signatory nations and provide only limited guarantees to
refugees, 9 they do offer guidelines and definitions that signatory nations are
obliged to consider in their refugee determination processes.' 0 Currently,
136 countries are party to one or both of the agreements and, in the interest
of safeguarding the rights and well-being of the world's twelve million
refugees, have accepted a duty to compromise state sovereignty in the
immigration context. 1
Under the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol, a refugee is
defined as any person who
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
7 David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1247, 1254 (1990).
8 HtLtNE LAMBERT, SEEKING ASYLUM: COMPARATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE IN SELECTED
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1-2 (1995); Refugee Convention, supra note 1; Refugee Protocol, supra note 1.
Australia is a party to both of these treaties.
9 The purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention has been identified by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, a
leading authority on refugee law.
The 1951 Convention was originally intended to establish, confirm or clarify the legal status of a
known population of the displaced. This met the needs of the time, and most provisions focus
on assimilation, or are premised on lawful residence or tolerated presence. There is nothing on
asylum, on admission, or on resettlement.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Future ofInternational Refugee Law, REFUGEES, Oct. 1998, at 28.
1o Patricia Hyndman, International Refugee Law and Some Implications for Procedures, 6 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 245, 246 (1994).
" Statistical Unit, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Refugees and Others of Concern
to UNHCR: 1998 Statistical Overview, Table 1.1 (visited Sept. 11, 1999)
<http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/98oview.htm> [hereinafter UNHCR Statistical Overview]. For the year 1998,
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees ("UNHCR") reported that almost 12 million people
worldwide qualified as refugees under the Refugee Convention definition. However, the combined figure
for refugees, returnees, and persons displaced within their own country was almost 22 million.
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avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such a fear, is unwilling to return to it.
12
This definition, when incorporated into municipal law, creates a narrow
exception to immigration policies that generally permit immigration for
reasons related to family and employment. 13 In effect, the refugee provision
offers an important tool to oppressed individuals who do not qualify for
immigration based on their family or employment status.
Protective standards and procedures have been incorporated into
municipal law as an increasing number of states have become parties to
these agreements. The United States, for example, modeled portions of both
the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Refugee Act of 1980 on the
Refugee Convention's language and on other international standards. 
14
Although some states have enacted refugee laws that in theory
incorporate their international commitments, many have enacted restrictive
amendments or implemented their laws poorly and have thus failed to
adequately protect refugees.' 5  This has occurred in the United States.
Although the language of U.S. refugee law suggests compliance with
international standards, an examination of how the laws are actually
implemented suggests otherwise.1 6  As James Hathaway, an authority on
international refugee law, has commented, "[s]tates pay lip service to the
importance of honouring the right to seek asylum, but in practice devote
12 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. l(A)(2); see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE
STATUS 2 (1992). In addition to the Refugee Convention definition, the Organisation of African Unity also
provides:
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the
whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, June 20, 1974, 1001
U.N.T.S. 14691, art. 1.2.
13 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 231 (1991).
14 Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of US. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 1
(1997). Although Professor Fitzpatrick discusses the textual similarities between U.S. refugee law and
international refugee law, the article argues that U.S. decisionmakers have failed to fully conform domestic
law to international standards. Id. at 3.
15 See generally id. See also discussion infra Part V, which examines Australia's international
obligations.
16 Fitzpatrick, supra note 14, at 3.
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significant resources to keep refugees away from their borders."' 7  In the
absence of an international organ with the authority or power to enforce
these commitments, Australia and other countries are able to consider
legislation that undermines their international commitments.' 8
B. The Development of Refugee Law in Australia
1. The Historical Backdrop and Public Opinion on Immigration
Under Australia's historically strict immigration controls, only narrow
grounds exist for processing asylum claims.' 9 In 1997, the United Nations
High Commission for Refugees ("UNHCR") reported that there were 9,300
asylum seekers in Australia. For the ten-year period from 1988 to 1997, the
UNHCR reported that 76,400 individuals applied for asylum in Australia.20
The relatively small number of people applying for refugee status in
Australia can be partially explained by Australia's consistent pattern of
imposing strict immigration controls.
Australia has limited immigration in several ways. Early immigration
policies made race and ethnicity the principal qualifying factors for
immigrants.2 1 Following World War II, Australia controlled immigration by
17 James C. Hathaway, Preface: Can International Refugee Law Be Made Relevant Again?, in
RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW, xvii, xvii (James C. Hathaway ed., 1997).
18 Id. This is not to suggest that Australia is somehow unique in its failure to fully consider its
international obligations. Instead, Australia is following a predictable pattern of behavior common among
industrialized countries.
'9 Robert Birrell, Immigration Control in Australia, 534 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106,
106 (1994). Birrell argues that Australian immigration policy is a result of the country's "heritage of
control." Specifically, Birrell identifies a pattern of policies, culminating in the reform efforts of the past
decade, which have resulted in "measures... much tougher than those enforced in North America." Id.
20 UNHCR Statistical Overview, supra note 11, at Table 17. The respective figures for other
countries include the United States, with 122,900 and 1,528,800; the United Kingdom, with 41,500 and
370,100; Canada, with 22,600 and 291,700; and France, with 21,400 and 339,500. Id.
21 CROCK, supra note 5, at 11. At the end of the nineteenth century, the desire to control
immigration and to achieve uniformity in immigration laws was a motivating factor "favouring the
federation of the colonies and the establishment of a Commonwealth." Id. at 13. Several of the colonies,
including New South Wales, South Australia, and Tasmania, passed the Colored Races Restriction Bills in
1896, but the British imperial government refused to approve the bills. Id. The establishment of a
Commonwealth in 1901 allowed Australia to enact immigration laws that were not subject to British
approval and that also provided uniformity across the continent. The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901
(renamed the Immigration Act in 1912, and ultimately repealed by the Migration Act of 1958) defined six
classes of prohibited immigrants. Id. The first class consisted of people who "when asked to do so by an
officer, [fail] to write out at dictation and sign in the presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in
length in a European language directed by the officer." Id. (quoting The Immigration Act § 3(a)). The
high level of proficiency needed to meet this requirement is illustrated by the following dictation test,
which was administered in 1908.
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requiring immigrants to sign contracts that allowed the Australian
government to specify their. employment for the first two years of their
residency in Australia.22 In 1949, the War-Time Refugees Removal Act was
enacted for the specific purpose of removing "Asian and other non-white
migrants" who had fled to Australia during World War 11.23 In Koon Wing
Lau v. Calwell,24 the High Court upheld the constitutionality of the War-
Time Refugees Removal Act. The Court stated:
Their presence here is wholly the result of the operations of
war, and is as visible and tangible, and in the opinion of
Parliament, may be as undesirable, as the unrepaired damage
done by enemy bombing to an Australian city, and may be as
validly dealt with under the defence power.25
The emphasis on race and ethnicity, which largely defined Australia's
immigration policies following World War II, has lessened in subsequent
decades, but the policy to strictly limit immigration has continued. The
proposed amendments are the Australian government's most recent attempt
to control immigration patterns. If passed, the proposed amendments will
drastically limit judicial review of refugee determinations and will
undermine the rights to which detained refugees are currently entitled.2 6
Public opinion has generally opposed increasing immigration levels.
Although almost twenty-five percent of all Australians are foreign-born,
27
the Australian public perceives immigration as a problem that requires
government action.28 Public perception, however, is often based on
misinformation and overt media influence. As Professor Mary Crock, a
leading Australian immigration law scholar, concludes, "concern about the
Very many considerations lead to the conclusion that life began on sea, first as single cells, then
as groups of cells held together by a secretion of mucilage, then as filament and tissues. For a
very long time low-grade marine organisms were simply hollow cylinders, through which salt
water streams.
Id. at 14 (quoting M. WILLARD, HISTORY OF THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY 126 (1923)).
22 Birrell, supra note 19, at 108.
23 CROCK, supra note 5, at 19.
24 Koon Wing Lau v. Calwell (1949) 80 C.L.R 533 (Austl.). The High Court of Australia is
established by the Australian Constitution and is the country's highest court. Australia Attorney General,
Australia's Legal System, available in Australia Attorney General Homepage (visited Sept. 27, 1999)
<http://www.law.gov.au>.
25 Koon Wing Lau, 80 C.L.R. at 594-95.
26 This is the combined result of the Judicial Review Amendment and Amendment No. 2.
27 Birrell, supra note 19, at 116.
28 The current government was elected on a platform that included a commitment to be tough on
immigrants and particularly on refugees. Id. at 117.
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phenomenon of uninvited refugees and asylum seekers is quite out of
proportion to the actual number of persons who seek refuge here. The level
of misunderstanding in the community is high, prompted in many cases by
poor reporting or blatant scare mongering tactics in the media., 29  The
adverse public perception of refugees has fostered an environment in which
the government is able to pursue increasingly strict immigration measures
without worrying about public scrutiny. 30
2. Legal Developments Related to Refugee Law
Since 1980, when the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act
("ADJR")3 1  formalized judicial review of administrative decisions,
Australian courts have become increasingly active in reviewing immigration
decisions.32 Judicial review has imposed levels of accountability and
scrutiny which, prior to 1980, were absent from both Australian immigration
law and administrative law in general. The legislature and the executive,
including the Department of Immigration, have not embraced this
development. In fact, the judiciary's active role in reviewing immigration
decisions has created an adversarial relationship between the courts and the
immigration bureaucracy.33
Over the past fifteen years, judicial decisions related to immigration
issues have frequently triggered legislative responses that have effectively
overruled, amended, or nullified the decisions. 34 For example, prior to 1989,
the Migration Act granted permanent residence to any non-citizen who could
demonstrate a need to immigrate based on "compassionate or humanitarian
29 CROCK, supra note 5, at 163. A survey of 368 people concluded that "30% exaggerated the
number of border refugee claimants by factors of between II and 26." Id. at 163 n.51.
" Id. at 163.
3' Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 (Austl.) [hereinafter ADJR Act].
32 Birrell, supra note 19, at 107.
33 CROCK, supra note 5, at 296. Professor Crock comments that "[a] close study of the migration
case law of recent years reveals a government that has become obsessed with controlling both immigration
into Australia and the role of the courts in the review of migration decisions." Id. (emphasis added).
31 Id. Professor Crock has referred to this relationship as "a continuum of such tit for tat legislative
amendments ... [that] can be linked to particular court cases or to trends in curial interpretation." Id. See
also Mary Crock, Administrative Law and Immigration Control in Australia: Actions and Reactions (1994)
(unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Melbourne (Austl.)) (on file with author). Similarly, Birrell
characterizes the court's approach as being "liberal [and] permissive ... cutting across the strict control
agenda pursued by the immigration bureaucracy." Birrell, supra note 19, at 11. Birrell asserts that this
approach can be attributed to the increasing influence of human rights ideals and the "body of international
case law influenced by such ideals," which is ultimately considered by the judiciary not only in Australia
but also in Canada, the United States, and in other countries. Id.
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grounds." 35 The Migration Act did not provide a more specific definition of
these grounds, and, during the 1980s, the Australian courts broadly
interpreted the language. 36  Motivated by the perceived need to limit
increasingly broad interpretations, the Minister of Immigration restricted
judicial discretion by defining "compassionate or humanitarian grounds. 37
Compassionate grounds were defined as involving a close familial
relationship with an Australian resident, and humanitarian grounds were
defined as involving "a significant threat to personal security on return as a
result of targeted action by persons in the country of return. 38 The Minister
of Immigration's restrictive response has become typical and is reflected in
the proposed amendments.
In 1989, the Australian High Court examined in detail the definition
of a refugee in Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.
39
Decided against the backdrop of the Tiananmen Square tragedy in China,4 °
the High Court rejected the Department of Immigration's earlier refusal to
grant Chan refugee status. 41  The Court found that the Minister of
Immigration had acted unreasonably by misapplying the "well-founded fear"
element of the refugee definition.4 2 Instead of applying the Department of
Immigration's "well-founded fear" standard, which required that the refugee
face a greater than fifty percent chance of persecution in his or her home
country, the Court applied a "real chance of persecution" standard. Under
this standard, a refugee can face a less than fifty percent chance of
persecution and still be eligible for asylum.43 For the Department of
Immigration and Parliament, this case represented the height of judicial
35 Prior to the 1989 reforms, the Migration Act granted permanent residence to any non-citizen who
could demonstrate "strong compassionate or humanitarian" grounds. Migration Act, supra note I, §
6A(l)(e); see also CROCK, supra note 5, at 130-3 1.
36 CROCK, supra note 5, at 133-34.
37 Permissive judicial interpretation had created a situation that, from the perspective of the director
of the Department of Immigration's Asylum Policy Branch at the time, merely required applicants to
demonstrate "a situation that would invoke strong feelings of pity or compassion in the ordinary member of
the Australian public." Id. (quoting Dr. E. Arthur, The Impact of Administrative Law on Humanitarian
Decision-Making, 66 CANBERRA BULL. PUB. ADMIN. 90 (1991)).
38 Birrell, supra note 19, at 113 (citing Minister of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic
Affairs, Media Release, no. 15, 1991).
39 Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 C.L.R 379 (Austl.); see also
CROCK, supra note 5, at 134.
40 The 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square and the accompanying Chinese government crackdown
resulted in about 20,000 Chinese claims for refugee status in Australia. Birrell, supra note 19, at 110.
4' Chan, 169 C.L.R 379. For a detailed discussion of Chan see also Mary Crock, Judicial Review
and Part 8 of the Migration Act: Necessary Reform or Overkill?, 18 SYDNEY L. REV. 267, 281-83 (1996)
[hereinafter Reform or Overkill]; see generally Mary Crock, Climbing Jacob's Ladder: The High Court and
the Administrative Detention ofAsylum Seekers in Australia, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 338 (1993).
42 Chan, 169 C.L.R. at McHugh, J. 42-44.
43 Id. at Mason, J. 12.
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activism.44 Members of Parliament, including the Minister of Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs, Philip Ruddock, mocked this interpretation as
setting a standard under which the pity of the average middle-class
Australian would be sufficient to establish refugee status.45
Three years later, the High Court decided Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister
of Immigration4 and held Section 54R of the Migration Act invalid.47
Section 54R of the Migration Act was part of a larger package of
amendments designed to counter a challenge to the Department of
Immigration's immigrant detention policy. 48  Specifically, Section 54R
provided that "[a] court is not to order the release from custody of a
designated person. 49 In response to Section 54R, the Court held:
A law of the Parliament which purports to direct, in unqualified
terms, that no court, including this Court, shall order the release
from custody of a person whom the Executive of the
Commonwealth has imprisoned purports to derogate from that
direct vesting of judicial power and to remove ultra vires acts of
the Executive from the control of this Court. Such a law
manifestly exceeds the legislative powers of the commonwealth
and is invalid.50
Following these and other similar cases,51 Parliament enacted Part 8 of the
Migration Act 52 in 1994 to counter what was perceived to be excessive
judicial activism.53
44Id.
45 Reform or Overkill, supra note 41, at 282.
46 Chu Kheng Lim and Others v. The Minister for Immigration, Local Gov't and Ethnic Affairs and
Another (1992) 176 C.L.R. I (Austi.).
47 Id. at Brennan, Deane and Dawson, JJ. 36-40. Section 54R of the Migration Act was enacted in
1992 and was formerly included in Part 2, Division 4B of the Migration Act. Section 54R is now codified
at Section 183 of the Migration Act.
48 Reform or Overkill, supra note 41, at 283.
49 Migration Act, supra note 1, § 183 (formerly contained within Part 2, Division 4B, § 54R).
Section 177 of the Migration Act defines a "designated person" as a non-citizen who arrives by boat and is
without a visa. Id. § 177.
'0 Chu, 176 C.L.R. at Brennan, Deane and Dawson, JJ. 38; see also AUSTL. CONST. § 75.
5' Other significant decisions that have challenged the Department of Immigration's refugee policies
include: Ly Sok Pheng v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, High Court Proceedings No. S199
(1992)(Austl.); Georgiadis v. Australian and Overseas Telecomm. Corp. (1994) 179 C.L.R. 297 (Austl.);
Minister for Immigration, Local Gov't and Ethnic Affairs v. A and B (1994) 127 A.L.R 383 (Austl.);
Somaghi v. Minister for Immigration, Local Gov't and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 F.C.R 100 (Austl.);
Heshmati v. Minister for Immigration, Local Gov't and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 31 F.C.R. 123 (Austl.). See
generally Reform or Overkill, supra note 41.
52 Migration Act, supra note 1, §§ 474-86.
5' See infra Part IlI.B.
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The proposed amendments represent the latest legislative response to
a judiciary that has refused to passively comply with the Department of
Immigration's refugee agenda. Minister Ruddock has been open about his
lack of faith in the judiciary. In a recent speech, Minister Ruddock
commented that some judges were making it their own business to "use
issues of error of law to wrongly reconsider cases on their merits ' 54 and that
they were "searching for loopholes to deliberately undermine the
government's refugee policies. 55  Minister Ruddock has also expressed
concerns that judicial review carries high costs in terms of legal expenses
and is being used as a tool to prolong the stays of refugee applicants. 6
These concerns, combined with the Australian government's general anti-
immigration posture, have led to the two proposed amendments.
The Judicial Review Amendment is the product of a struggle between
the executive, which wants to control immigration strictly, and the judiciary,
which is more concerned with individual rights in the context of both
Australian law and international human rights law. If enacted, the Judicial
Review Amendment would repeal the existing judicial review provisions of
the Migration Act and replace them with a privative clause. 7 The privative
clause would make administrative immigration determinations final and
would prevent the judiciary from reviewing such decisions. This is not the
first time such legislation has appeared before Parliament. In 1996, a
substantively similar bill was considered but failed to gain sufficient support
for passage. 8
Amendment No. 2 is a legislative response to the 1996 case Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission v. Secretary of the Department
of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.5 9 The Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission ("HREOC") is a government agency that was
established primarily to oversee the proper functioning of other government
agencies with regard to human rights. 60  As a part of this function, the
54 Roderick Campbell, Law Society Fights Ministerial Attack on Judges, CANBERRA TIMES, Dec. 8,
1998, at Al.
5 Loma Knowles, Ruddock Hits back at Sir Anthony Mason, AAP NEWSFEED, Dec. I1, 1998,
available in LEXIS, AAP Newsfeed File.
56 Richard McGregor, Judges Accused of Legal Frolic, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 7, 1998, at 1.
57 Judicial Review Amendment, supra note 3, § 474.
58 CROCK, supra note 5, at 265 (citing Migration Legislation Amendment Bill No. 5, 1997). See also
Tensions Rise Over Courts' Immigration Review Powers, AAP NEWSFEED, Dec. 26, 1997, available in
LEXIS, AAP Newsfeed File.
59 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm'n v. Secretary of the Dep't of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs (1996) 444 F.C.A. 1 (Austl.). See discussion infra Part IV.B on this case and
Amendment No. 2.
60 The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission ("HREOC") was established to oversee
the effective functioning of government agencies with regard to "the indivisibility and universality of
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HREOC is authorized by law to provide legal information in sealed
envelopes, including forms and information regarding legal rights, to citizen
and non-citizen detainees. 61 In HREOC v. Department of Immigration, the
court determined that Section 20(6)(b) of the HREOC Act obligated the
Department of Immigration to deliver sealed correspondence from the
HREOC to a detainee, regardless of whether or not the detainee actually
requested the information. The court expressly rejected the Department of
Immigration's assertion that only information actually requested by the
detainee must be delivered.63 Instead, the court held that regardless of
whether the HREOC was acting on its own initiative or on the basis of
information provided by a third party, the Department of Immigration had an
obligation to deliver the correspondence. 64 Amendment No. 2 would
overrule HREOC v. Department of Immigration because it provides that the
Department of Immigration is under no obligation to deliver
communications to a detained immigrant unless the immigrant first makes a
complaint to either the HREOC or the Commonwealth Ombudsman. 65
Amendment No. 2 is not Parliament's first attempt to overrule
66HREOC v. Immigration. In 1996, Parliament considered Migration
Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1996, which was identical in substance
to the proposed Amendment No. 2.67 Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1996 was
human rights; and the principle that every person is free and equal in dignity and rights." Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, §§ 10A, 11.
6 Section 20(6)(b) of the HREOC Act states,
A person who is detained in custody.., is entitled.., to have delivered to the detainee, without
undue delay, any sealed envelope, addressed to the detainee and sent by the Commission, that
comes into the possession or under the control of the custodian or of a custodial officer.
Id. § 20(6)(b).
62 HREOC v. Department of Immigration, 444 F.C.A. at Lindgren, J.
63 id.
6 Id. Justice Lindgren concluded that "[p]aragraph 20(6)(b) operates to give a detainee the right to
have delivered to him or her a sealed envelope satisfying the description in that paragraph without the
necessity of a prior request by the detainee." Id. at 24.
65 Amendment No. 2, supra note 4, § 193. The Commonwealth Ombudsman processes citizen
complaints against government agencies. Similar to Section 20(6)(b) of the HREOC Act, Section 7(3)(b)
of the Ombudsman Act provides that
[A] person who is detained in custody is entitled ... to have delivered to him or her, without
undue delay, any sealed envelope, addressed to him or her and sent by the Ombudsman, that
comes into the possession or under the control of the person in whose custody he or she is
detained or of any other person performing duties in connection with his or her detention.
Ombudsman Act, 1976, § 7(3)(b) (Austl.).
66 See discussion infra Part IV for the amendment's effect.
67 CROCK, supra note 5, at 213.
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criticized as placing Australia in breach of its international obligations
relating to refugees and failed to gain sufficient support for passage. 68
III. PROCESSING REFUGEE CLAIMS
A. Hearing and Reviewing a Refugee Claim Through the Administrative
Process
The claim for refugee status begins with a primary determination. In
the primary determination, a case officer, who is an employee of the
Department of Immigration, either finalizes a decision or makes a
recommendation to grant or deny asylum. 69 This occurs under the direction
of the Determination of Refugee Status ("DORS"), a section of the
Department of Immigration. The case officer's decision may be appealed to
the Refugee Review Tribunal, which is an administrative organ.
Assessment at the primary determination stage frequently occurs
without legal representation or advice for the applicant.7 0 Moreover, most
case officers do not have formal legal training.7 ' These factors inevitably
increase the risk of incorrect decisionmaking.72 The refugee applicant
initiates a claim for protective status by completing a questionnaire.73 An
interview, which is transcribed and becomes a part of the applicant's record,
is generally conducted at this stage.7 4 Based upon the application, interview,
supporting documentation, and the Department of Immigration's own
information on the applicant's country, the case officer makes a
recommendation to a delegate of the Minister of Immigration.75 Trained
legal personnel are almost never involved in this process, as the case officers
68 id.
69 Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, Overview of Refugee Determination Procedures in Australia, 6 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 253, 253-54 (1994).
70 Id. at 253-55.
71 Id.
72 id.
73 Two different questionnaires are currently used. For refugees applying as onshore applicants, the
questionnaire is long and detailed. Id. at 253 & n.3. For "boat people," a shorter, less-detailed application
is used. Id. The rationale is that "boat people," who are always held in detention, will be interviewed
shortly after submitting the application. 1d.
4 An interview is not required and is administered at the discretion of the case officer. Public-
Affairs Section, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Migration Fact Sheet 41, Seeking
Asylum Within Australia (visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/41asylum.htm>.
However, the Department of Immigration maintains that as a matter of practice, an adverse decision will
not be made without first interviewing the applicant. Fonteyne, supra note 69, at 254.
75 Fonteyne, supra note 69, at 254.
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are not required to have legal qualifications 76 and the applicant has no right
to legal representation.77 Furthermore, although DORS has a legal division
that case officers and other officials can consult, the division has so few
attorneys in relation to the number of refugee applications that it can only
provide legal advice in a small percentage of the cases.78
The Refugee Review Tribunal ("RRT") can review a DORS decision
that denies an applicant's claim to refugee status.79  The RRT has broad
powers to conduct reviews of denied refugee claims and "is not bound by
technicalities, legal forms or rules of evidence." 80 The RRT replaced an
earlier "paper" system. Under this system, DORS decisions were reviewed
solely on the written record and without a hearing of any kind." This
system proved to be inefficient and susceptible to judicial review. 82  The
RRT was developed not only to increase efficiency83 (especially in light of
the substantial case backlog in the early. 1990S) 84 but also to reduce the need
for judicial review.85
The RRT is a quasi-inquisitorial body with the power to investigate an
applicant's refugee claim and the discretion to set the parameters of an
appeal.8 6 The only significant restraint on the RRT is that it cannot rule
against an applicant without first providing an oral hearing.87 At the
76 Id. at 254 & n.8. Although Fonteyne notes that his information is not precise, in 1994 he
determined that less than five percent of case officers were legally qualified. Further, the minimal amount
of legal training provided to case officers on "the substantive aspects" of the refugee definition has
generated wide criticism. Id.
77 Although legal representation is theoretically allowed, the Department of Immigration's practice
"appears ... at least in the case of boat people, not to allow any outside contact (including contact with
legal advisors) until after the initial interview by departmental officers." Id. at 253 & n.4. See Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm'n v. Secretary of the Dep't of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
(1996) 444 F.C.A. 1 (Austl.), for an example of how the Department of Immigration has denied detained
refugee applicants access to legal representation.
78 Fonteyne, supra note 69, at 255 & n.9. Information from 1992 revealed that the DORS Refugee
Law Section employed five lawyers and that from July 1992 to July 1993, 11,758 applications passed
throuh the primary or review stage. Id.
Migration Act, supra note 1, §§ 410-56.
8o Id. § 420. See generally Fonteyne, supra note 69, at 255-58.
81 CROCK, supra note 5, at 257.
82 Id. at 258.
83 Migration Act, supra note 1, § 420(1). Section 420(1) provides that the function of the Refugee
Review Tribunal ("RRT") is to provide "a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and
quick." Id.
84 Largely as a result of China's Tiananmen Square tragedy, there was a backlog of 21,000 asylum
claims in 1993. Birrell, supra note 19, at 110.
85 Mary Crock & Mark Gibian, Before the High Court. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
v. Eshetu, 20 SYDNEY L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1998) [hereinafter Before the High Court].
86 CROCK, supra note 5, at 258; Migration Act, supra note 1, §§ 423-29.
87 Migration Act, supra note 1, §§ 424-25. Section 424(l) provides that if the RRT is prepared to
make a decision "favourable to the applicant," then the applicant does not have a right to appear before the
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hearing, an applicant has no right to call witnesses, 88 to cross-examine
witnesses, 89 or to have an attorney present. 9° A non-English speaking
applicant only has a right to translations of those parts of the hearing during
which the applicant is spoken to directly and not to a translation of the entire
hearing. 91 Additionally, if the applicant's appeal to the RRT is unsuccessful,
the applicant is required to pay a "post-decision" fee of 1000 Australian
dollars.92 This fee is designed to deter unmeritorious claims. In making its
determination, the RRT is not confined to the evidence presented at the
hearing and can consider previously submitted evidence.93 The RRT has the
power to affirm a decision, to vary a decision, to remit the matter for
reconsideration, or to make an entirely new decision.94 The decision must be
provided in a written statement. This statement must set out the reasons for
the decision and the findings of material questions of fact and must reference
the evidence on which the findings of fact are based.95
Although one of the objectives for establishing the RRT was to reduce
the need for judicial review, judicial oversight of the administrative
96decisionmaking process continues to be necessary. From July 1993
through December 1998, the RRT decided 22,083 cases.97 Refugee status
was granted in thirteen percent of these cases.9 8 Of the 1,788 RRT decisions
RRT. On the other hand, when the RRT is not prepared to rule in favor of the applicant, the applicant must
be given an opportunity to appear and to present evidence. Id. § 425(I)(a).
88 Id. Section 426(2) provides that the applicant may notify the RRT of her desire to "obtain oral
evidence from a person or persons named in the notice," but that the RRT is not required to honor this
request. Id. § 426(3).
"9 Id. § 427(6)(b).
9o Id. § 427(6)(a).
91 Id. § 427(7).
92 Review of Migration Regulation 4.31B, available in Parliament of Australia Homepage (visited
Feb. 19, 1999) <http:www.aph.au/house/committee/MIG/regulation/index.htm>. The fee provision is
scheduled to expire in June 1999. At the time of writing, the Joint Standing Committee on Migration was
accepting submissions on whether or not to continue imposing the fee. Scrap S1,000 "Penalty" on Failed
Asylum-Seeker Plea, AAP NEWSFEED, Feb. 26, 1999, available in LEXIS, AAP Newsfeed File.
93 Dr. Peter Nygh, Refugee Review Tribunal, Refugee Review Tribunal Practice Directions § 2.1
(Sept. 23, 1998) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/rrt/practice.html>.
94 Migration Act, supra note 1, § 415.
9' Id. § 430(l).
96 From 1982 to 1992, 1,067 applications for judicial review of migration determinations were filed
with the Federal Court and the High Court. This statistic includes all immigration decisions and not solely
refugee determinations. Reform or Overkill, supra note 41, at 287-90. In comparison, from 1993 to 1996,
1,360 applications were filed. At the current rate of increase, 4,533 applications will be filed from 1993 to
2003. Id.; see also Public Affairs Section, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Migration
Fact Sheet 86, Litigation Involving Migration Decisions (visited Apr. 21, 1999)
<http://www.immi.gov.au/facts/41 asylum.htm>.
97 Id.
98 Refugee Review Tribunal, RRT Statistical Information at 31 December 1998 (visited Apr. 21,
1999) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/rrt/statist.html> [hereinafter RR T Statistical Information].
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that have been reviewed by the courts since July 1993, 240 have been set
aside in favor of the applicant.99 As these statistics indicate, judicial review
is an integral component of the refugee determination process. Without
judicial review, 240 credible refugees would have been returned to the
countries from which they fled.'00
B. Judicial Review
In 1994, the Migration Act was amended by Part 8,101 which
substantially restricted judicial review of all immigration determinations.' 0 2
Prior to this amendment, judicial review was generally available through the
ADJR Act and the Judiciary Act, under which the procedure for review of
immigration determinations was the same as for any other administrative
determination. 10 3  Part 8 removed the possibility of seeking review under
either of these acts and specified how and when review of immigration
determinations could occur. 04
Part 8 specifies the immigration decisions that are reviewable by the
Federal Court, 10 5 the grounds for judicial review,'0 6 which parties have
standing, 10 7 and the powers of the Federal Court.'0 8  Section 475 of the
Migration Act limits reviewable decisions to final determinations of an
administrative body such as the RRT. I09 Section 475(2) prohibits judicial
review of decisions still reviewable by an administrative body or decisions
made by the Minister of Immigration either not to exercise, or not to
consider the exercise of, his discretionary power." 0 Applications for judicial
review must be filed no later than twenty-eight days after an applicant is
notified of a decision."' Additionally, under Section 479, only the person
actually subject to a decision has standing to seek review of the decision. 12
99 The RRT reports that it has made 22,083 decisions. Of these decisions, 8.1% were appealed to the
courts. Of the decisions that were reviewed by the judiciary, 19% were set aside. Id.100 To return (refouler) a credible refugee to the circumstances from which they fled is a violation of
the Refugee Convention. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33. See infra Part V.C.
101 Migration Act, supra note 1, §§ 474-86.
102 See Reform or Overkill, supra note 41, at 269-80.
103 See supra Part II.B.2.
104 Reform or Overkill, supra note 41, at 270.
105 Migration Act, supra note 1, § 475.
'06 Id. § 476.
107 Id. § 479.
'0' Id. §481.
"9 Id. § 475.
"o Id. § 475(2). The Minister's discretionary powers are provided for in the Migration Act. Id. §§
48B, 72(i)(c), 91F, 945, 951,417, and 454.
'2 Id. § 478(l)(b).
'2 Id. § 479.
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Under the ADJR Act, standing was given to a "person aggrieved," a
provision which was interpreted to confer standing on "all persons whose
interests are adversely affected" by the decision, including dependents."
3
In an attempt to restrict judicial access and to curb judicial activism,
Part 8 narrowed and eliminated previously recognized grounds for review.l4
The grounds available for judicial review in Part 8 are (1) failure to observe
required procedures, (2) lack of jurisdiction in the decisionmaker, (3)
making a decision that is not authorized by the act or regulations, (4) making
a decision that is an improper exercise of power, (5) an error of law
involving an incorrect interpretation or an incorrect application of the law to
the facts, (6) fraud or actual bias, and (7) a lack of evidence to justify the
decision." 5 The failure to make a decision provides additional grounds for
review.' 16 Grounds for review that Part 8 eliminated are (1) denial of natural
justice, (2) unreasonableness, (3) taking an irrelevant consideration into
account, (4) failure to take into account a relevant consideration, (5) bad
faith, and (6) any other abuse of power."1
7
Part 8 has not reduced the number of decisions actually reviewed by
the courts. Instead, since the passage of Part 8, the number of cases
reviewed has risen sharply. 18  In 1994-95, the courts received 400
applications for judicial review.'9 For 1998-99, this number is expected to
exceed 1000.120 In 1997-98, when 800 applications were filed, the
government incurred litigation costs of over nine million Australian
dollars. ' These costs are predicted to rise to twenty million Australian
dollars by the year 2002.122 The government justifies the proposed Judicial
Review Amendment in part by citing these high costs of litigation.'
23
11 Reform or Overkill, supra note 41, at 273 & n.13 (citing Tooheys Ltd. v. Minister for Bus. and
Consumer Affairs (1981) 36 A.L.R. 64 (Austl.)); Bedro v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
(1987) 14 A.L.D. 131 (Austl.).
114 Reform or Overkill, supra note 41, at 272.
115 Migration Act, supra note 1, § 476(1).
116 Id. § 477.
117 Reform or Overkill, supra note 41, at 272. Migration Act, supra note l, §§ 476(2)-(3).
... THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, SENATE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LEGISLATION COMMITTEE, CONSIDERATION OF LEGISLATION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE MIGRATION
LEGISLATION AMENDMENT (JUDICIAL REVIEW) BILL 1998 1.4 (quoting Minister Ruddock, Second




122 Id. See also Liz Rudall & Max Blenkin, Aust. Immigration Levels May Rise: Ruddock, AAP
NEWSFEED, Mar. 7, 1999, available in LEXIS, AAP Newsfeed File.
123 JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 118. The Department of Immigration has
predicted savings of up to 50% in legal costs if the proposed judicial review amendment is enacted. Id.
1.7 (citing Submission No. 23, Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Attachment B, 5).
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Although Part 8 has not reduced the number of decisions actually
reviewed by the courts, it has been successful in curtailing judicial activism
and maintaining very low set-aside rates.124 Since July 1993, the courts have
upheld eighty-one percent of the RRT decisions submitted for review.'
25
The courts have largely accepted the restrictions imposed by Part 8. Even in
cases where the lower courts have broadly interpreted Part 8, the High Court
(and the Federal Court) have frequently called for judicial deference. 126
Although the High Court has acknowledged that the power of the Federal
Court to review immigration decisions has been "severely truncated" under
Part 8,127 it has confirmed Parliament's constitutional power to "limit the
grounds upon which that court can examine the correctness or, at all events,
the lawfulness of the decision."'
128
Despite the general trend of judicial acquiescence to Part 8, several
decisions have fueled the government's desire to further limit judicial
review. In 1997, the Federal Court broadly interpreted a reference in
Section 420 to "substantial justice" and determined that this provision
requires the RRT to review a primary determination in accordance with
substantial justice and the merits.' 29  The failure to take "relevant
considerations" into account may constitute a neglect of "substantialjustice."' 130 The court found for the applicant because the RRT made a
number of errors in interpreting the definition of a refugee. Effectively, the
court chose not to read the Section 476 review limitations literally and
124 CROCK, supra note 5, at 292. "The more recent cases coming from the Federal Court reveal an
interesting trend. In its review of refugee decisions, that court is proving very reluctant to overturn
decisions by the RRT." Id.
125 RRT Statistical Information, supra note 98. Of these, 53% of the applications for review were
withdrawn by the applicant. The remaining 19% resulted in a favorable decision for the applicant and were
decided either by a court or by the RRT upon consent for reconsideration. Id.
126 See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Guo Wei Rong and Others (1997) 144 A.L.R.
567 (Austl.) (in which the High Court rejected a full Federal Court decision which held that the RRT had
misapplied the test for determining refugee status); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Wu
Shan Liang (1996) 185 C.L.R. 259 (Austl.).
127 Abebe v. Commonwealth of Australia; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
(1999) H.C.A. 14, 21 (Austl.).
:28 Id. 1.
29 Moges Eshetu v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 142 A.L.R 474, rev'd
en banc (Full Federal Court) (1997) 145 A.L.R. 621, 624, 636 (Austl.). The High Court of Australia has
granted the Minister for Immigration leave to appeal the full Federal Court's decision, but at the time of
writing a decision had not been entered. For a case note on Eshetu, see Before the High Court, supra note
85. See also Sun Zhan Qui v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 151 A.L.R. 505, 548
(Austl.) ("[l]f the tribunal's treatment of the issues is so unreasonable that it must be said the decision could
not have been made by a reasonable person, there has not been 'substantial justice"'.).
130 Before the High Court, supra note 85, at 464.
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indicated a willingness to review both the tribunal procedures and the
substantive bases of the tribunal's decisions.'31
IV. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
A. The Judicial Review Amendment
If adopted, the Judicial Review Amendment would severely limit
refugee access to the courts. This would impact the accuracy and
effectiveness of decisionmaking at the administrative level. To invest
finality at the administrative level without leaving any opportunity to seek
judicial review would grant administrative decisionmakers unchecked power
that would undermine the accuracy and effectiveness of the refugee
determination process. There are also serious questions regarding the
constitutionality of the Judicial Review Amendment and its implications for
separation of powers in Australia's government. 32 Based on these concerns,
the Judicial Review Amendment should be rejected.
1. The Privative Clause
The privative clause, which is the central feature of the Judicial
Review Amendment, effectively eliminates judicial review of administrative
decisions made under the Migration Act.' 3  Section 474(2) of the Judicial
Review Amendment defines a privative clause decision as any decision of an
"administrative character made ... under this [Migration] Act.' 34 Section
474(1) provides that a privative clause decision is "(a) final and conclusive;
(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in
question in any court; and (c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus,
injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account."'' 35 The
Judicial Review Amendment also explicitly removes the jurisdiction of the
131 Id.
132 Law Council Opposes Migration Legislation Amendments, AUSTRALIAN LAW (Law Council of
Australia), available in Law Council of Australia Homepage (visited Feb. 4, 1999)
<http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/aulw 1297.htm>.
133 Judicial Review Amendment, supra note 3, § 474.
114 Id. § 474(2). This definition would include decisions made by the RRT.
"' Id. § 474(1). Section 474(4) of the amendment lists decisions that are not privative clause
decisions. These mostly include decisions relating to property rights such as liability for costs, seized
valuables, the detention of vessels, and the taking of securities. Also included are decisions relating to the
members of the review tribunals. Id. § 474(4).
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Federal Court to hear immigration appeals under either the Judiciary Act or
the Administrative Appeals Act.' 
36
2. Parliament's Power to Exclude Judicial Review
Although Parliament has the power to define and, if it chooses, to
withdraw Federal Court jurisdiction over a matter, it lacks similar authority
over the High Court.' 37 The Federal Court is merely a creature of legislation
and is ultimately subject to Parliament's control. In contrast, the High Court
is constitutionally mandated and its power of original jurisdiction is
guaranteed by the Australian Constitution.' 38  The constitutionality of the
Judicial Review Amendment is thus questionable because it withdraws both
Federal Court and High Court jurisdiction over immigration decisions.
The Minister for Immigration argues that this is not the first occasion
a privative clause has been used to limit the High Court's jurisdiction, and
that case law affirms the constitutionality of enacting a privative clause in
the immigration context. 139  The government asserts that the Hickman
principle, which emerged from The King v. Hickman,'40 validates the
constitutionality of the privative clause. 41  This case upheld the
constitutionality of the privative clause, but it also identified certain
exceptions to the use of such a clause. Justice Dixon of the High Court
explained that a privative clause can validly restrict judicial review, provided
that the decision of a lower body "is a bona fide attempt to exercise its
power, that it relates to the subject matter of the legislation, and that it is
reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the body."'142  The
136 Id. §§ 476,483-84.
137 CROCK, supra note 5, at 294.
' 8 The Australian Constitution grants the High Court original jurisdiction in all matters "in which a
writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth."
AUSTL. CONST., supra note 50, § 75(v).
139 JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 118, 2.27 (citing The Hon. Phillip Ruddock,
MP, Narrowing ofjudicial review in the migration context, 19).
140 The King v. Hickman (1945) 70 C.L.R. 598 (Austl.); Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 C.L.R.
598 (Austl.).
14' THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, SENATE, MIGRATION LEGISLATION
AMENDMENT (JUDICIAL REVIEW) BILL 1998, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 15 (1998), circulated by
authority of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Hon. Philip Ruddock MP
[hereinafter JUDICIAL REVIEW EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM].
142 The King v. Hickman, 70 C.L.R. at 615. Since 1945, the Hickman principle has been affirmed in
subsequent cases. CROCK, supra note 5, at 295 & n. 11 (citing R v. Commonwealth Rent Controller; Ex
parte Nat'l Mut. Life Assoc. of Australasia Ltd. (1947) 75 C.L.R. 361 (Austl.); R v. Central Reference Bd.;
Ex parte Thiess (Repairs) Pty. Ltd. (1948) 77 C.L.R. 123 (Austl.); Bank of New S. Wales v.
Commonwealth (1948) 76 C.L.R. 1, 175 (Austl.); R v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration; Ex parte Grant (1950) 81 C.L.R. 27 (Austl.); R v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration
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King v. Hickman and subsequent cases interpret the available grounds for
challenging a privative clause decision as constitutional invalidity, narrow
jurisdictional error, or mala fides.143  Although the Hickman principle
provides exceptions under which a privative clause may be circumvented,
the standard required to review the privative clause determination is high.
Under this standard, an RRT decision would be difficult to challenge. As
Professor Crock has noted, "[t]he privative clause becomes a mechanism for
expanding the jurisdiction of the tribunal so as to deem lawful all decisions
made in a bona fide attempt to exercise a power.
' 44
Although a privative clause is considered constitutionally valid in
theory, courts have questioned its use in certain contexts. In Darling Casino
Ltd. v. New South Wales Casino Control Authority,145 the Court noted that
its constitutionally protected jurisdiction would be gradually eroded if a
privative clause prevented it from reviewing jurisdictional errors
generally. 46 The Court also indicated its reluctance to relinquish its power
to intervene where legal determinations are made by individuals who do not
have any legal training.147 The proposed use of a privative clause to protect
the decisions of bodies such as the RRT, which engages in findings of fact
and law, is distinguishable from earlier cases in which the clause was used to
protect decisions of lower courts and bodies constituted for the sole purpose
of making findings of fact.' 4 8 When a privative clause is confined to the
latter contexts, it does not undermine the principle that the bodies making
final determinations on questions of law should be the courts.
149
It is difficult to predict whether the High Court would uphold the
constitutionality of a privative clause in the context of immigration. This,
however, provides further reason to question the government's motivations
in proposing this amendment. As the Refugee Council of Australia
commented, "to pass legislation that the Government knows will be
challenged in the High Court on constitutional grounds is neither good
Comm'n; Ex parte Amalgamated Eng'r Union (1967) 118 C.L.R. 219 (Austl.); R v. Coldham; Ex parte
Australian Workers' Union (1983) 153 C.L.R. 415 (Austl.); Deputy Comm'r of Taxation v. Richard Walter
Pty. Ltd. (1995) 183 C.L.R. 168 (Austl.); O'Toole v. Charles David Pty. Ltd. (1991) 171 C.L.R. 232
(Austl.)).
143 JUDICIAL REVIEW EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 141, 15 (citing The King v.
Hickman, 70 C.L.R. 598). Malafides refers to a decision in bad faith.
144 CROCK, supra note 5, at 295 (citing O'Toole v. Charles David Pty. Ltd., 171 C.L.R. at 275).
145 Darling Casino Ltd. v. New S. Wales Casino Control Auth. (1997) 143 A.L.R. 55 (Austl.).
146 CROCK, supra note 5, at 295-96. See AUSTL. CONST., supra note 50, § 75(v).
147 CROCK, supra note 5, at 295-96.
"4 JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 118, 2.30 (quoting Submission No. 5, Law
Council of Australia, 4).
149 Id.
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governance nor the mark of a government interested in saving taxpayers
[sic] funds.' 50  This amendment, which proposes potentially
unconstitutional legislation, reflects the determination of the Department of
Immigration and some members of Parliament to further limit immigration.
3. Separation of Powers
The Judicial Review Amendment arises out of the power struggle over
immigration decisionmaking that has defined the Australian executive's
experience with the judiciary over the past fifteen years.' 51 Central to this
struggle has been the executive's perception that because immigration
implicates foreign affairs, it should be handled exclusively by the executive,
and that judicial intervention in the immigration process is actually a form of
interference in the exercise of executive power.'52  This amendment uses
legislative power to further reduce the judiciary's role in immigration.
Australia's commitment to the principle of separation of powers
would be weakened by the Judicial Review Amendment. Of fundamental
importance to a government premised on principles of separation of powers
is a commitment to these principles. In the present matter, one branch of
government (the executive) is using another branch of government (the
Parliament) to exclude a third branch of government (the judiciary) from its
role of providing a check on the other two branches. In such circumstances,
caution should be exercised. 153 In Australia, a fundamental role of the courts
is to review the decisions of governmental actors. This is particularly true
when rights, privileges, duties, obligations, or other legitimate expectations
are affected. 1!4  An abridgement of this role jeopardizes the delicate
arrangement of checks and balances on which tripartite democracy is
based. i"
The absence of a judicial check on executive decisions in the
immigration process is cause for significant concern. For the RRT to
function fairly and effectively, its determinations must be subject to judicial
review. Judicial oversight enhances the quality of initial decisions by
150 Id. 2.40 (quoting Submission No. 7, Refugee Council of Australia, 3).
131 See Reform or Overkill, supra note 4 1.
152 JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMIT-rEE REPORT, supra note 118, 2.23 (quoting THE PARLIAMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, SENATE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS LEGISLATION
COMMITTEE, CONSIDERATION OF LEGISLATION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE, MIGRATION LEGISLATION
AMENDMENT BILL (No. 5) 1997 (Oct. 30, 1997), Submission No. I IE, Mr. Michael Chaaya, 314).
... Id. 2.20.
154 Id. 2.19 (quoting Submission No. 4, Administrative Review Council, 5).
IS' Id. 2.20
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placing pressure on decisionmakers to make decisions carefully and to
provide intelligible reasons for their position.1 56  This process forces
decisionmakers to identify and to resolve analytical problems before
judicial.scrutiny is even applied. 157
Additionally, judicial review helps foster independence at the
decisionmaking level and insulates decisionmakers from political
pressure. 158 The members of the RRT ("RRT Members") hold their
positions for limited terms that are renewable at the Minister of
Immigration's discretion. 59 Even with judicial review, this structure
imposes considerable pressure on the RRT Members to decide cases in a
way that will promote their prospects for reappointment.16  If judicial
review is eliminated and RRT Members can no longer rely on the judiciary
to affirm politically unpopular decisions, RRT Members will be even more
vulnerable to political pressure.
Political pressure on RRT Members has been the subject of recent
controversy in Australia. In December 1996, the RRT ruled against the
Department of Immigration and awarded refugee status to two women
whose claims were based on spousal abuse.161 Following the decision,
Minister Ruddock publicly criticized the members of the RRT and was
quoted as saying, "[t]he view I take would be if there are tribunal members
who have fixed term appointments who clearly make decisions outside the
international law ... their appointments would be ones I would be highly
unlikely to renew."' 162  Reappointment statistics suggest that Minister
Ruddock's threats are not idle. In June of 1997, thirty-five RRT Members
applied for reappointment. Of these, sixteen were not reappointed.
163
Despite existing judicial oversight, the RRT has become increasingly
vulnerable to political pressure. The elimination of a judicial check on the
RRT means that there will be no judicial mechanism to ensure that
immigration determinations are made in accordance with the law.
156 Stephen H. Legomsky, Refugees, Administrative Tribunals, and Real Independence: Dangers
Ahead/for Australia, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 245 (1998) [hereinafter Legomsky].
, Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the Theory of Judicial Review, 73 MINN. L. REV.
1205, 1210-11 (1989) [hereinafter Legomsky 1989].
158 Legomsky, supra note 156, at 246.
'9 Id. at 250.
160 Id.
161 Mike Steketee, Ruddock Flags Tougher Line on Refugee Bids, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 26, 1996, at 1.
162 Id.
163 Legomsky, supra note 156, at 250. According to unconfirmed information, the two RRT
members that Minister Ruddock had criticized were not reappointed. Id.
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4. The Right to Appeal
A decision to grant or deny refugee status is of grave importance to the
asylum seeker and is literally on the magnitude of life or death. 64 When an
administrative determination has such significant implications, the opportunity
for judicial review is a necessary and fundamental right. 165  The Judicial
Review Amendment, by eliminating the possibility ofjudicial review, does not
recognize this fundamental right. This failure ultimately undermines the
credibility of Australia's refugee decisionmaking process.
The proposed amendment jeopardizes the integrity and accuracy of the
refugee determination system because administrative decisionmaking is
susceptible to inaccuracies and judicial review is needed to correct such
mistakes. First, the proposed system would make the RRT the final body for
review. The RRT is only equipped to undertake a merits review, and the
review of legal error is beyond its jurisdiction. 66 The absence of a mechanism
to review legal error at the administrative level makes it necessary to retain
judicial review. Second, the RRT's merits review is itself often inadequate
because the decisionmakers are not legally trained, which makes it difficult for
them to apply the complex and frequently amended immigration laws in an
appropriate manner. 167  In short, to eliminate judicial review of immigration
determinations is an affront to the legal process, which relies on access to the
courts for the vindication of legal rights. 1
68
B. Amendment No. 2
Amendment No. 2 limits the assistance that the Department of
Immigration is required to provide to refugees. Amendment No. 2 overrules
"A JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 118, 2.49 (quoting Submission No. 7,
Refugee Council of Australia, 7).
165 See generally Legomsky 1989, supra note 157.
66 The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee commented that "[b]y allowing for
merits review but not judicial review, the [Department of Migration] seems to be implying that although
factual errors are made by the Department, legal errors never are." JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMITrEE REPORT,
supra note 118, 2.55. On this matter, the Refugee and Immigration Legal Centre commented:
The rationale for this presumably is either that it is the belief of the Government that the
Department of Immigration does not make errors as to procedure or jurisdictional errors or,
alternatively, it does make such errors but persons applying under the Migration Act are not
deserving of protection from these errors.
Id. (quoting Submission No. 1, Refugee and Immigration Legal Centre, 2).
167 Id. 2.60.
168 Law Council of Australia, Unprecedented Call for Parliamentary Inquiry into Government
Refugee Determination Practices (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lcamed73.htm>.
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HREOC v. Department of Immigration and provides. that the Department of
Immigration is obligated to deliver information from the HREOC or the
Commonwealth Ombudsman only if the detainee has made a "complaint" to
one of these agencies. Specifically, Amendment No. 2 prohibits the
operation of HREOC Act Section 20(6)(b) and Ombudsman Act Section
7(3)(b) in the immigration context. Both of these sections provide that a
detained person is entitled to receive legal and other information delivered
by the respective agency, regardless of whether the information has been
requested. 1
69
The amendment also provides that the Department of Immigration has
no obligation to provide any information to detained immigrants unless such
information is actually requested. Specifically, the Department of
Immigration would be under no obligation to provide an application form for
a visa, provide advice as to whether a person may apply for a visa, allow any
opportunity to apply for a visa, or allow access to advice (legal or
otherwise).170
Amendment No. 2 makes applying for refugee status substantially
more difficult because it limits the access of immigrant detainees to
information about their rights. In theory, the amendment does not
eliminate the right to legal representation, but in practice it denies refugees
access to information about the existence of this right. 72  One justification
for this amendment presented by the Minister of Immigration is that
immigrants who arrive in Australia without a visa should explain why they
arrived and must articulate their desire for legal assistance. 173
Unfortunately, the Minister's position ignores the practical difficulties
faced by arriving refugees. Considering the cultural differences between
169 Amendment No. 2, supra note 4, § 193. For the language of Section 20(6)(b) of the HREOC Act
and Section 7(3)(b) of the Ombudsman Act, see supra note 61 and supra note 65, respectively.
170 Migration Act, supra note 1, § 193; Amendment No. 2, supra note 4, §§ 193(2), 256. Section 193
of the Migration Act currently provides that no obligation exists to offer advice as to whether a person may
apply for a visa, to allow any opportunity to apply for a visa, or to allow access to advice (legal or
otherwise). Migration Act, supra note 1, § 193. The amendment will add that the Department of
Immigration is under no obligation to provide an application form for a visa. Amendment No. 2, supra
note 4, § 193(2). Although the amendment and Section 193 clearly absolve the Department of Immigration
of any affirmative obligations, Section 256 of the Migration Act qualifies Section 193 and directs the
Department of Immigration to provide access to certain advice, forms, and facilities upon the detainee's
request. Migration Act, supra note 1, §§ 193, 256; Amendment No. 2, supra note 4, §§ 193 and 256.
171 Law Council Says Migration Bills Illegal, AAP NEWSFEED, Jan. 21, 1999, available in LEXIS,
AAP Newsfeed File [hereinafter Migration Bills Illegal].
172 THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, SENATE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LEGISLATION COMMITTEE, CONSIDERATION OF LEGISLATION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE, MIGRATION
LEGISLATION AMENDMENT BILL (No. 2) 1998, Dissenting Report by the Australian Democrats & Greens
(WA) 4 (April 1999) [hereinafter AMENDMENT NO. 2 REPORT].
173 Id. (citing Minister Ruddock, Second Reading Speech to the Bill, 1).
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Australia and the home countries of many refugees, the lack of awareness of
legal rights or support agencies such as the HREOC, the emotional stress of
arriving in a new country, and the limited language skills of recent arrivals,
the burden of having to file a "complaint in writing" before receiving
HREOC support is unreasonable.174  In reality, it is unlikely that many
refugees will make such a request.
The proposed amendments will undermine the effectiveness and
accuracy of Australia's refugee determination process. By removing judicial
review, which serves as a check on the administrative process, the Judicial
Review Amendment will increase the likelihood of inaccurate refugee
decisions. In addition, there are also concerns regarding the constitutionality
of the amendment and its implications for separation of powers in
Australia's government. Finally, Amendment No. 2, by restricting how and
when refugees can access information and assistance from government
agencies, will undermine the effectiveness of the refugee determination
system. Without knowledge of their rights or of the legal system generally,
refugees will be unable to process claims as effectively as they could with
the assistance of third parties such as the HREOC.
V. AUSTRALIA'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
The Judicial Review Amendment and Amendment No. 2 raise critical
questions regarding Australia's compliance with its international obligations.
Australia is a party to the Refugee Convention, 75 the Refugee Protocol,"76
the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 17 7 the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, 178 the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Torture
174 Id. 1.35. Regarding the conditions under which an undocumented arrival is held, the Refugee
Advice and Casework Service commented,
[W]hile [the bill] does not remove the right of an immigration detainee to make a formal
complaint ... in practice it is impossible. The people are held in isolation, incommunicado.
There is no telephone ... There are no postal facilities ... They have no contact with other
detainees who are in the general body of the camp. They cannot pass a letter to other detainees.
. Therefore, on a purely practical level ... the detainees themselves cannot physically initiate
[an] investigation.
Id. 2.32 (quoting Transcript of Evidence, 1996 Inquiry, Refugee Advice and Casework Service, 175).
175 Refugee Convention, supra note 1.
176 Refugee Protocol, supra note I.
177 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, June 6, 1960, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.
178 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
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Convention"), 79 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR").180  Each of these agreements imposes certain obligations
on signatory parties that are relevant to the treatment of asylum seekers. The
U.N. Human Rights Committee has already found that Australia's refugee
detention procedures violate the ICCPR.' 18  The enactment of the proposed
amendments may place Australia in further violation of its international
obligations. 1
82
A. The Judicial Review Amendment Jeopardizes the Right to a Fair and
Impartial Hearing
Australia may be in violation of the ICCPR if it passes the Judicial
Review Amendment. The ICCPR requires that "all persons shall be equal
before the courts and tribunals . . [and] shall be entitled to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal."'183 The RRT
probably does not meet this standard, as it lacks members with sufficient
legal training, functions under political pressure, and is frequently not open
to the public. 184 The current refugee determination system only satisfies this
provision because refugee applicants have recourse to the judiciary, which
provides competency, political independence, and impartiality. If refugees
are denied recourse to the judiciary, the fairness and impartiality of refugee
determinations in Australia would be significantly weakened.
179 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
[hereinafter Torture Convention].
IS0 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
"I A v. Australia 560/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, Apr. 30, 1997. In response to a
complaint filed by a detained refugee that challenged Australia's immigration detention policies, the U.N.
Human Rights Committee found Australia in violation of its obligations under the ICCPR. See also
CROCK, supra note 5, at 213.
182 See generally Debra Way, Immigration Bill Discriminatory, AAP NEWSFEED, Feb. 25, 1999,
available in LEXIS, AAP Newsfeed File.
183 ICCPR, supra note 180, art. 14.1. Article 14.1 provides:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Id.
194 JUDICIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 118, 2.66 (citing Submission No. 2, Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 4-5).
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B. Amendment No. 2 and the Right to Information
Amendment No. 2 fails to consider Australia's international
obligation to provide detained persons with certain basic rights, including
the right to legal information and legal services.' 85  If enacted, this
amendment will limit how detained immigrants can obtain information and
when information can be provided. 
186
Amendment No. 2 violates Principle 13 of the U.N. Principles for
Persons in Detention, which requires the authority responsible for a person's
detention to provide the person with an explanation of his rights. 187  The
amendment ignores this principle by limiting both HREOC and
Commonwealth Ombudsman support for immigration detainees and by
clarifying that the Department of Immigration has no duty to provide
refugees with any information.
Amendment No. 2 also violates Articles 9.4 and 10 of the ICCPR.
Article 9.4 provides that a detainee has a right to challenge the lawfulness of
her detention. 188 Article 10 provides that everyone in detention must be
"treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person." 189 Article 10 has been interpreted to mean that detainees
have a right to legal information, a right to equal treatment, and a right to
challenge the validity of their detention. 190 These rights are undermined by
185 U.N. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, Principle 13, G.A. Res. 43/173, annex, U.N. GAOR 43rd Sess., Supp. No.49, at 298, U.N.
Doe. A/43/49 (1988) [hereinafter Principles for Persons in Detention]. Principle 13 provides:
Any person shall . .. at the commencement of detention ... or promptly thereafter, be provided
by the authority responsible for his ... detention ... with information on and an explanation of
his rights and how to avail himself of such rights.
Id. Although U.N. General Assembly resolutions are not considered binding sources of international law,
they do have the status of recommendations and may be cited in support of asserted norms of customary
law. See generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). AMENDMENT No. 2 REPORT, supra
note 172, 3.1.
:86 Migration Bills Illegal, supra note 171.
87 Principles for Persons in Detention, supra note 185, principle 13.
188 ICCPR, supra note 180, art. 9.4. Article 9.4 provides that "[ainyone who is deprived of his liberty
... shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court ... [to] decide without delay on the lawfulness of his
detention." Id. See also A v. Australia for a discussion of Australia's detention procedures, which the
U.N. Human Rights Committee determined were in violation of Articles 9.1 and 9.4 of the ICCPR. A v.
Australia, supra note 181.
189 ICCPR, supra note 180, art. 10.1. Article 10.1 provides that "[a]ll persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person." Id.
'9 AMENDMENT No. 2 REPORT, supra note 172, 3.1-3.5. See also Hyndman, supra note 10, at
246-47. Here, Hyndman identifies three minimum procedures arising from the Refugee Convention and
the Refugee Protocol. Under the Protocol,
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Amendment No. 2, which effectively precludes any meaningful opportunity
to challenge the detention and creates a distinction between detained
immigrants and everyone else in the application of the HREOC Act.
C. The Proposed Amendments and the Principle ofNon-Refoulement
The amendments substantially alter Australia's refugee determination
system and jeopardize compliance with the principle of non-refoulement.
Under the principle of non-refoulement, a country has a duty to prevent the
return of a refugee to a country where the refugee faces a genuine risk of
serious harm. 191 The principle of non-refoulement is the most fundamental
obligation imposed by international refugee law. The Refugee Convention
provides that "[n]o contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a
refugee... to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened .. ,192 This principle is referenced not only in the Refugee
Convention but also in the Refugee Protocol,193 the Torture Convention,
194
and other international agreements.' 95
By increasing the risk that refugees will not have an adequate
opportunity to raise and process credible asylum claims, the two
amendments will cause Australia to violate the non-refoulement principle.
Amendment No. 2 will restrict access to important legal information. This
will make it difficult for refugees to even assert a claim to refugee status.
The Judicial Review Amendment will make determinations on claims that
may have been inadequately processed at the administrative level final and
unreviewable. The passage of the amendments will result in mistakes in
refugee determinations and the return of credible refugees.
The proposed amendments will undermine Australia's ability to meet its
international obligations. By removing judicial review (which will jeopardize
the right to a fair and impartial hearing), restricting access to legal information
Refugee status determination procedures at a minimum must (1) be accessible to those who need
access to them; (2) be so constructed that they afford applicants a fair opportunity to show that
they come within the criteria for granting refugee status; and (3) not subject the criteria of the
Refugee Convention definition to misinterpretation.
Id. Where Amendment No. 2 significantly limits access to refugees, the first two procedures are
undermined.
'9' Broadly, the principle of non-refoulement states that "no refugee should be returned to any
country where he or she is likely to face persecution or torture." GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (1996).
192 Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 33.
193 Refugee Protocol, supra note 1, arts. 1, 7.1.
194 Torture Convention, supra note 179, art. 3.
'9' See generally GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 191, at 124-25.
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and assistance, and establishing a refugee determination process that will
increase the likelihood of refoulement, the amendments will cause Australia to
violate its international obligations.
VI. CONCLUSION
If Australia desires to provide an accurate, fair, and effective system for
processing refugee claims, the proposed amendments must be rejected. Just
five years after enacting the current restrictions on judicial review, the
Australian government is attempting to further exclude the judiciary from
decisions made under the Migration Act by proposing the Judicial Review
Amendment. The judiciary's importance in the immigration process mirrors
its importance in society as a whole. Judicial review not only provides a direct
check on executive decisions but also imposes a presence that fosters accurate
decisionmaking at the administrative level in general. Especially in the
context of rising immigration levels, which are politically unpopular, the
refugee needs the safeguards of the judiciary. The Judicial Review
Amendment is also of questionable constitutionality. The amendment's use of
a privative clause to prevent judicial review of immigration decisions by the
Federal Court and the High Court is unprecedented in the immigration context
and may violate the Australian Constitution. For these reasons, the Judicial
Review Amendment should be rejected.
Amendment No. 2 limits how and when a detained immigrant can
access information and assistance that is often critical in applying for asylum.
Newly arrived refugees are wholly ignorant of Australia's laws and legal
system and must rely on the advice and information of third parties such as the
HREOC and the Commonwealth Ombudsman. Amendment No. 2 would
prevent these agencies from contacting a detained refugee and would thus
impede the refugee's access to this critical information. Furthermore, the
restrictions imposed by both the Judicial Review Amendment and Amendment
No. 2 may violate Australia's commitments under international law.
Unless the proposed amendments are rejected, the accuracy and
effectiveness of Australia's refugee determination system will be jeopardized.
The failure to process refugee claims accurately will result in the return of
refugees to countries where their lives are endangered. Australia's
commitment to fair and accurate decisionmaking on the domestic front and to
human rights law on the international front will be critically undermined if the
proposed amendments are enacted.
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